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This paper explores the history of South Africa’s oil-from-coal project, SASOL, the petro-
chemical company central to apartheid South Africa’s response to oil sanctions. Contrary to 
popular perception, South African interest in synthetic fuel pre-dates anti-apartheid 
sanctions. Anglovaal, a private mining company, acquired rights to the German Fischer-
Tropsch process for converting coal into liquid fuel in the 1930s and its subsidiary, 
SATMAR, converted torbanite into petrol and was an important precursor to SASOL. Like 
Germany, South Africa possessed no indigenous source of oil and dependence on imports 
came to be seen as a strategic and economic vulnerability. Afrikaner nationalist reluctance to 
commit monies to Anglovaal to build an oil-from-coal plant lead to SASOL’s establishment 
as a parastatal. Even so, this paper argues, the project possessed enough ‘Smutsian features’ 
to attract criticism from Afrikaner nationalists. The low cost of black labour in the early 
apartheid era was important to the project’s initial financial viability but the paper argues 
that it was the state intervening to regulate the fuel market, discipline the oil multinationals 
and massively subsidise oil-from-coal which saved the project from obsolescence. Energetic 
management also mattered: with low oil prices preventing oil-from-coal expansion during 
the 1960s, SASOL leveraged state support to facilitate diversification into the wider petro-
chemical industry. After Sharpeville, SASOL spearheaded South Africa’s increasingly 
isolationist oil strategy while at the same time SASOL managers became increasingly 
defensive about their dependence on state support. SASOL’s privatisation in 1979 was, 
however, precipitated by the need to fund two massive new oil-from-coal plants in the 
aftermath of the Oil Shock and Iranian Revolution to meet the apartheid state’s strategic 
priorities. SASOL’s new hybrid identity as a company with private shareholders enjoying 
public subsidies continues to be controversial.  
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Introduction  
 
South Africa was doubly out of step during the second half of the twentieth century. 
Belligerently beating a white supremacist path in an era of decolonisation, it persisted with 
economically uncompetitive dependence on coal as a feedstock for fuel production in 
defiance of the global energy transition described by Timothy Mitchell.1 The two seem 
closely, perhaps causally, related. Two arguments falling under the rubric of a theory of 
South African exceptionalism come readily to mind. The first would explain South Africa’s 
energy adventurism by emphasising the survivalism of Afrikaner nationalists who rose to 
power in 1948. In Saul Dubow’s words, this elite was ‘determinedly insular and wholly 
focused on the survival of white South Africa.’2 The second, indebted to Harold Wolpe’s 
cheap labour thesis, underlines the importance of apartheid’s political economy - specifically 
cheap black labour – in defining the character of South African sonderweg.3  
 
Renfrew Christie has stressed the importance of cheap energy derived from coal mined by 
hyper-exploited black labour in driving South African industrialisation.4 Gabrielle Hecht and 
Paul Edwards have noted the frequent coded invocation of ‘South African conditions’ – a 
reference to Apartheid’s labour regime – in official explanations for the viability of 
technological systems under Apartheid.5 Nancy Clark has insisted that instead of challenging 
mining companies, the parastatals partnered with the mines and replicated their dependence 
                                                
1 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (New York: Verso, 2011). 
 
2 Saul Dubow A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Science, Sensibility, and White South Africa, 1820–2000 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),  p. 248. 
 
3 Harold Wolpe. ‘Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid’,  Economy 
and Society 1( 4) 1972, pp. 425-456. 
 
4 Renfrew Christie, Electricity, Industry and Class in South Africa (London: MacMillan, 1984). 
 
5 Gabrielle Hecht and Paul Edwards ‘History and the Technopolitics of Identity: The Case of Apartheid South 
Africa’,  Journal of Southern African Studies 36 (3) 2010, pp. 619–639. 
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on low paid, low skilled black workers.6 Similarly, Ben Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee have 
downplayed the contribution of the parastatals to industrial diversification, arguing instead 
for increased interpenetration of public and private capital as part of the growing 
conglomeration of the economy.7  
 
South Africa’s oil-from-coal project appears to be a clear demonstration of the arguments 
offered by this literature about the primitively exploitative basis of South Africa’s techno-
industrial achievements. There were repeated references in the early apartheid period, in 
precisely the manner Hecht and Edwards have identified, to the importance of the low cost of 
mining coal to the viability of oil-from-coal in South Africa. This was, however, no longer 
the case by the 1970s as a result of changes in the political economy of labour recruitment to 
the mines. We therefore have to look beyond a recapitulation of the revisionist cheap labour 
thesis for other explanations for why SASOL escaped the obsolescence many critics 
predicted. 
 
Drawing on a range of archival materials drawn from National Archives, SASOL’s own 
archives and interviews, this paper traces South Africa’s oil-from-coal project from its pre-
apartheid conception through to its privatisation in the late apartheid years. It argues that it 
was the state intervening to regulate the fuel market, discipline the oil multinationals and 
massively subsidise oil-from-coal that was decisive to the project’s viability, as was chemical 
diversification driven by SASOL’s energetic management. South African interest in synthetic 
fuel production reflects a ‘national capitalist’ prioritising of parastatals to diversify economic 
                                                
6 Nancy Clark, Manufacturing Apartheid: Parastatals in South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1994). 
 
7 Ben Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South Africa: From Minerals-Energy Complex to 
Industrialisation (London: Hurst, 1996). 
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activities in the country away from its historic bases in mineral extraction.8 While some 
historians saw the parastatals as a ‘Hertzogite’ intervention, it makes sense, as Bill Freund 
has argued, to see them as a ‘Smutsian’ creation.9 This paper challenges Tim Cross’s view of 
SASOL as uncomplicatedly in the grip of Afrikaner nationalists.10 Though many of SASOL’s 
senior figures possessed undoubted Afrikaner nationalist pedigree, these engineers and 
scientists were the inheritors of a Smutsian tradition running through H. van der Bijl and H. J. 
van Eck. SASOL became increasingly nativist as South Africa became increasingly isolated, 
but the project also possessed unavoidably cosmopolitan aspects which attracted criticism 
among hardcore Afrikaner nationalists. 
 
Like its decolonising neighbours in southern Africa later in the century, white South Africa 
embraced parastatals as engines of modernisation.11 However odious SASOL’s involvements 
in apartheid, the execution of a project of synthetic fuel production on SASOL’s scale, in the 
                                                
8 Keith Hart and Vishnu Padayachee, ‘A History of South African Capitalism in National and Global 
Perspective’, Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 81/82 (2013) pp. 55-85. 
 
9 Bill Freund, ‘A ghost from the past: the South African developmental state of the 1940s’, Transformation, 
81/82 (2013), pp. 86-114, p. 91. 
 
10 Tim Cross, ‘The Afrikaner Takeover: Nationalist Politics and the Colonization of South Africa's 
Parastatals, 1948 to 1960’, Collected Seminar Papers: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Vol. 48 (London: 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1994) p. 123. 
 
11 Key literature which is enlightening on the development of secondary industry and parastatals in South Africa 
includes: Belinda Bozzoli, ‘The origins, development and ideology of local manufacturing in South Africa’, 
Journal of Southern African Studies 1 (2) 1975, pp. 194-214; David Kaplan, ‘The politics of industrial 
protection in South Africa, 1910–1939’, Journal of Southern African Studies 3 (1) 1976, pp. 70-91; Renfew 
Christie, Electricity, Industry and Class in South Africa (London: MacMillan, 1984); Nancy L. Clark. 
Manufacturing Apartheid: Parastatals in South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Dan 
O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital, and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1934-
1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983);and Fine and Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South 
Africa: From Minerals-Energy Complex to Industrialisation. More recent work includes: Bill Freund ‘A ghost 
from the past: the South African developmental state of the 1940s’; Hart and Padayachee, ‘A history of South 
African capitalism in national and global perspective’; Simon Roberts and Zavareh Rustomjee ‘Industrial policy 
under democracy: apartheid’s grown-up infant industries? Iscor and Sasol’, Transformation: Critical 
Perspectives on Southern Africa, 71 (2010) pp. 50-75. See also Rod Crompton, ‘The South African commodity 
plastics filiere: history and future strategy options’ (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Natal, 1994); 
and Richard Hengeveld and Jaap Rodenburg (eds.), Embargo: Apartheid's Oil Secrets Revealed (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 1995). 
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absence of a significant pool of highly skilled labour certainly does take on the appearance of 
an ‘exercise in courage’, if we keep in mind South Africa’s status in intellectual, economic 
and institutional terms before the building up of its major parastatals.12  
 
During the 1960s, however, oil prices remained low, which meant oil-from-coal expansions 
were put on hold. SASOL instead leveraged state support to move aggressively into the South 
African chemical industry and, after Sharpeville, spearheaded South Africa’s increasingly 
isolationist oil strategy. At the same time that they were co-ordinating the apartheid state’s oil 
strategy, SASOL managers began to speak increasingly defensively about their dependence 
upon state support. When SASOL went private starting in 1979 – half a decade before the 
privatisations following South Africa’s debt crisis – its managers spoke of a dream fulfilled.13 
SASOL’s privatisation was in fact precipitated by the demands of funding two massive new 
oil-from-coal plants in the aftermath of the Oil Shock and Iranian Revolution. It was a case of 
privatisation by panic to meet the apartheid state’s strategic priorities. SASOL’s new hybrid 
identity as a company with private shareholders enjoying continued state support proved 
immediately controversial in the closing years of apartheid and has continued to be so to the 
present. 
  
 
 
 
                                                
12 E. A. Bunt, ‘Some Highlights of Engineering Research in South Africa’, in A. C. Brown (ed.), A History of 
Scientific Endeavour in South Africa (Cape Town, 1977), quoted in Dubow, Commonwealth of Knowledge, p. 
251. 
 
13 On the privatisation of the parastatals, see Andries Bezuidenhout and Jacklyn Cock, ‘Corporate power, 
society and the environment: a case study of ArcelorMittal South Africa’, Transformation: Critical Perspectives 
on Southern Africa, 69, (2009); James Jude Hentz, ‘The Two Faces of Privatisation: Political and Economic 
Logics in Transitional South Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 38 (2) 2000, pp. 203-223; Ben Fine, 
‘Privatization and the RDP: A critical assessment’, Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 
27 (1995); Nancy L. Clark, Manufacturing Apartheid, especially chapter seven.  
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‘Tailor made for South African conditions’ 
 
Synthetic fuel derived from coal first emerged from experimentation in the laboratories of 
Weimar Germany which, like South Africa, possessed no indigenous source of oil but had 
abundant reserves of coal. Once Hitler came to power – as anti-apartheid campaigners 
delighted in pointing out – these synthetic technologies were put into the service of Nazi 
autarkic fantasies. Synthetic fuel supplies sourced from oil-from-coal plants never rose to 
significant levels and conventional refining remained cheaper, despite Nazi tariffs. Because 
of its association with Nazi military strategy, the German synthetic fuel industry was 
dismantled in the aftermath of the war.14 It was the Anglo Transvaal Consolidated Investment 
Company (Anglovaal), a South African mining house, which first took the lead in developing 
oil-from-coal in South Africa.15 Anglovaal discovered bitumen shales (torbanite) in Ermelo 
district of the Transvaal and in 1934 established the South African Torbanite Mining and 
Refining Company Limited (SATMAR), producing petrol and bitumen from torbanite at a 
refinery on Johannesburg’s East Rand. Because of the presence of low-grade coal among the 
shales, in 1936 the company acquired rights to the Fischer-Tropsch process, one of the major 
German oil-from-coal processes. Like its successor SASOL, Anglovaal’s torbanite operation 
depended on subsidisation through elevated customs duty and rail tariffs on imported petrol.  
 
Anglovaal employed H.J Van Eck, future head of the Industrial Development Corporation, to 
investigate establishing an oil-from-coal plant in South Africa. On a visit to Germany in 
October 1936, A.P.J. Fourie, Minister of Commerce and Industries in the Fusion government, 
                                                
14 Arnold Krammer, ‘Fueling the Third Reich’, Technology and Culture, 19 (3) 1978, pp. 394-422; Thomas 
Parke Hughes, ‘Technological Momentum in History: Hydrogenation in Germany, 1898-1933’, Past & Present, 
44 (August 1969), pp. 106-132. 
 
15 Mendel Kaplan and Marian Robertson, The Jewish Roots in The South African Economy, (Cape Town: C. 
Struik, 1986) p. 109. 
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was taken by Van Eck and another Anglovaal consulting engineer, C. Feldmann, to visit one 
of the first Fischer-Tropsch factories established in Germany. Apparently impressed, Fourie 
promised government support for Anglovaal’s plans but the notoriously headstrong Oswald 
Pirow, acting in Fourie’s post in his absence, unexpectedly lowered the cost of imported 
petrol railage, which severely affected the economics of SATMAR’s torbanite operation and 
synthetic fuel production in general.16  
 
Additional requests by Anglovaal in the late 1930s for protection for an oil-from-coal factory 
– including a fixed petrol price and the allocation of a ‘portion of the market for petrol’ to oil-
from-coal output – were rebuffed by the fiscally conservative Finance Minister N.C. 
Havenga, who said the industry would have to ‘stand on its own merits as an ordinary profit 
earning business venture.’17 South African Railways and Harbours also objected, seeing oil-
from-coal as a threat to its income because the transportation of imported petrol and refined 
products from Durban to Johannesburg on behalf of the oil multinationals was one of its most 
lucrative sources of revenue.18 Ministers were put off by the size of Anglovaal’s request for 
nearly £15 million from the state.19 Officials also correctly suspected Anglovaal’s interest in 
securing financial support for oil-from-coal was driven by a desire to cross-subsidise its 
uncompetitive SATMAR operation.20  
 
                                                
16 SASOL Archive, 015/2 SATMAR, R.S. Dickie to A.S. Hersov, 6 April 1937 
17 SASOL Archive, 015/2 SATMAR, W.J. Lamont to A.S. Hersov, 27 Oct 1936; SASOL Archive, 015/2 
SATMAR, Precis of evidence given before governmental Fischer-Tropsch commission at Pretoria, 17-19 March 
1937 by Mr R.S. Dickie and Dr H.J van Eck, 1 April 1937. 
18 SASOL Archive, 015/2: SATMAR, H.J. Van Eck Memorandum (24 March 1942) on SATMAR Proposition 
submitted to the government by Mr A.P. Faickney. 
 
19 SASOL Archive, 05/1 (105); Oil-from-Coal, Oil from Coal in the Union Memorandum, May 1941, C. 
Feldmann. 
 
20 SAB HEN 711, 92/2/21, Power, Spirits and Oil Industry. Establishment of Industry: Petrol and Allied 
Substances from Coal. Fischer Tropsch Process: Confidential Report: 'The Production of Petrol in South Africa' 
20 September, 1937. 
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Anglovaal brought Dr Franz Fischer, one of the developers of the Fischer-Tropsch process to 
South Africa in 1938 where he was guest of honour at a Rand Club reception hosted by H.J 
van der Bijl and attended by forty representatives ‘of the mining houses and scientific and 
social circles in the Union’.21 After the War broke out the company’s further approaches to 
government emphasised the military value of the project, arguing for ‘an explicit long term 
charter’ to ‘protect the company against changes in fiscal conditions and inequitable 
competition.’ Anglovaal insisted that wartime conditions meant ‘the economic factor could 
be ignored.’ The government, however, remained reluctant to protect the company through 
‘interference with the general market structure.’22 Moreover, the oil price remained low; thus 
even though he had recently worked on oil-from-coal for Anglovaal, H.J van Eck, writing as 
head of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in 1942, admitted that  ‘there's a 
cheaper option, namely stockpiling and storage.’23  
 
Nonetheless Anglovaal persisted, acquiring the rights to a new American (and purportedly 
more advanced) version of Fischer-Tropsch in 1945. Sufficient official enthusiasm existed for 
the promulgation of the 1947 Liquid Fuel and Oil Act, empowering the granting of a license 
by government for the production of petrol via oil-from-coal. Anglovaal was the obvious 
candidate but the following year the South African pound was devalued, massively increasing 
the cost of importing materials for plant construction. Anglovaal’s attentions (and capital) 
were diverted to the opening up of the Free State gold fields. The company was unable to 
raise loan finance for oil-from-coal from overseas lenders, particularly after the 1948 victory 
                                                
21 SASOL Archive, 05/1 (105); Oil-from-Coal, Oil from Coal in the Union Memorandum, May 1941, C. 
Feldmann. 
 
22 SASOL Archive 015/2 SATMAR, ‘Scheme for Expansion of Undertaking’, 10 March 1942. 
 
23 SASOL Archive, 015/2: SATMAR, H.J. Van Eck Memorandum (24 March 1942) on SATMAR Proposition 
submitted to the government by Mr A.P. Faickney. 
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of the Herenigde Nasionale Party in 1948.24 In April 1950, Frans du Toit, industrial advisor to 
the state (and a Broederbonder) told van Eck there was a ‘strong feeling in Afrikaans-
speaking circles’ that the project should be state-controlled and funded through the IDC 
rather than with the involvement of a private company.25  
 
SASOL’s establishment in 1950 was celebrated in parliament as the birth of a strategically 
important enterprise ‘not controlled from abroad or by international monopolies and cartels 
but by the South African state.’26 State ownership would have other benefits. SANLAM’s Dr. 
M.S ‘Tienie’ Louw advocated full state ownership ‘to avoid the complication of reconciling 
the conflicting interests of the consuming public, who want lower prices, and a small group 
of private shareholders, who want higher dividends.’27 The flipside to autarkic rhetoric was 
language framing the project in terms of its geopolitical value to the West in the event of 
‘another global conflagration’ where the Suez Canal might be closed to shipping - in which 
case South Africa would be the ‘logical link between the West and the Middle East.’28 Cold 
War defence priorities were increasingly invoked by SASOL managers, though often for 
instrumental purposes aimed at speeding up the import of American construction materials.29  
 
SASOL was also presented as an important step in the development of a diversified industrial 
base in the country. In the words of Etienne Rousseau, its founding Managing Director, gold 
was ‘a wasting asset and it is important that the industrial structure be diversified in order that 
it may become independent of the gold mining industry as the latter peters out.’30 For Dr A.J. 
                                                
24 SASOL Archive, 002, Oil-from-Coal, E. Rousseau to J. van der Merwe, 10 July 1948. 
25 SASOL Archive, P.A 11, Oil-from-Coal, F.J du Toit to H. Van Eck, 21 April, 1950. 
26 Hansard, South African Parliamentary Debates, 10 April 1951. 
27 SASOL Archive, 002, Oil-from-Coal, 'Telephone Conversation: Dr M.S Louw's Opinion, 11 September 1950. 
28 SASOL Archive, 002, Oil-from-Coal, Report to the Interim Committee, 18 August 1950. 
29 SAB, HEN 3513/539, SA Coal Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL) General, D.P. de Villiers to F. du Toit, 29 
October, 1951. 
30 SAB, HEN, 3512/539, SASOL (General) E. Rousseau, ‘Considerations regarding the establishment of an oil 
from coal industry in South Africa’, 22 September 1951. 
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Norval, Chairman of the Board of Trade and Industries, SASOL’s appeal lay in the urgent 
necessity of the country exploiting its abundant reserves of low grade coal ‘before atomic 
energy and alternative sources of energy make coal useless’.31 Minister of Economic Affairs 
Eric Louw was less worried about impending competition from alternative sources of energy, 
boasting that the country had an inexhaustible supply of coal, or what he dubbed ‘oil-
potential’. ‘We have enough coal’, he claimed, ‘to meet South Africa's requirements for the 
next 500 years.’32 While there was some reticence within SASOL about bringing its factory 
online too hastily, plans were accelerated in 1951 because of rising oil prices and delivery 
problems from an increasingly unstable Middle East, the source of all South Africa’s 
imported oil. 
 
SASOL’s founding Board of Directors possessed an impressive Afrikaner nationalist 
pedigree, but it would be a mistake to overstate the extent to which the project was defined by 
Afrikaner nationalist interests, particularly in the pre-Sharpeville period. In his analysis of the 
‘Afrikanerisation’ of the parastatals in the early apartheid period, Tim Cross presents SASOL 
as uncomplicatedly in the grip of Afrikaner nationalists, simply by virtue of its establishment 
after 1948.33 Contrary to Cross’s account, however, SASOL was criticised for the amount of 
English used within the parastatal as well as for the paucity of Afrikaners employed in top 
technical posts, where English speakers and foreigners featured prominently. Responding to 
these criticisms Etienne Rousseau despaired at the lack of qualified Afrikaners while 
defending the necessarily cosmopolitan make-up of SASOL’s staff. Rousseau was working in 
the context of a besieged Smutsian tradition. Writing to Minister of Economic Affairs Nico 
Diederichs – who had instigated investigation into the ‘Afrikanernisation’ of the parastatals – 
                                                
31 SAB, AES AM 7/2 A7/3, SASOL, Notes on Informal discussion about SASOL & Aksyns with Dr Norval, F. 
du Toit and E. Rousseau, 22 March 1954. 
32 Hansard, South African Parliamentary Debates, 10 April, 1951. 
33 Tim Cross, ‘The Afrikaner Takeover: Nationalist Politics and the Colonization of South Africa's 
Parastatals, 1948 to 1960’, p. 123. 
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Rousseau recalled that when H.J Van Eck had joined the Industrial Development Corporation 
‘his fellow-Afrikaners’ had written him off for working for Jan Smuts. Van Eck’s children 
attended Jan Celliers School in Johannesburg, where Van Eck served on the school 
committee. His decision to work for Smuts led to him being pushed off the committee by 
other parents. He moved his children to an English medium school and sent them to the 
University of Natal, such was the ostracisation which association with the Smuts government 
provoked. Forlornly noting that he was now subject to similar treatment, Rousseau 
concluded: ‘one feels that the Afrikaans speaker who turns his back on a future in the wide 
business world to build up undertakings such as ISCOR, the Industrial Development 
Corporation and SASOL for the benefit of the country, will be criticised and even abused by 
the very people that he endeavours to serve.’34 
 
More than ethnicity, what tied a number of SASOL’s early elite team together was the fact 
they had worked together at SATMAR in the late 1930s; they were accustomed to working 
on those aspects of petrochemicals where special state support was necessary to ensure 
financial viability. On SASOL’s establishment doubts remained about whether SASOL could 
avoid meeting the same fate as SATMAR, whose unravelling a number of senior SASOL 
figures had witnessed first-hand. Their response to this uncertainty is perhaps suggested by 
their repeated references during the opening years of the project to SASOL being ‘tailor made 
for South African conditions’, a reference to the comparatively cheap cost of labour (and thus 
of coal mining) at the time.35 As Gabrielle Hecht and Paul Edwards have noted in their 
analysis of apartheid-era technological projects, these kinds of formulations present intensely 
                                                
34 SAB, MES, 218/H4/7, SASOL, E. Rousseau to N. Diederichs, 30 September, 1959. 
35 SASOL Archive, 002, Oil-from-Coal, Report of Interim Committee to establish a South African Synthetic Oil 
Industry, 2 September 1950.  
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social-political facts in depoliticised terms, as if owed to the accidents of geology, rather than 
political economy.36  
 
World Bank officials had repeatedly queried SASOL’s predicted labour costs during 
negotiations over a £15 million loan for the project. ‘They did not seem to appreciate that the 
whole South African economic set-up is vastly different from that of America,’ Rousseau 
explained. Rousseau insisted doubts about economic viability ‘do not apply to South African 
conditions’ because ‘low-grade coal can be mined at a very low cost.’ 37  However, ‘cheap 
coal’ only applied during the early apartheid period. From the early 1970s, SASOL’s coal 
mine labour costs, together with those across the rest of the country’s various mining sectors, 
rose significantly (by as much as 60 per cent) as decolonisation jeopardised regional southern 
African migrant labour supplies, forcing the ‘South Africanisation’ of mine workforces, 
coupled with increasing recognition of the need to lift wages to enhance labour 
productivity.38 If labour costs were only contingently important to SASOL’s economic 
prospects, what mattered most to the economics of the project over the long term was the role 
of the apartheid state in providing extraordinary financial and regulatory support for the 
indigenous production of fuel.    
 
‘Artificial economics and government protection’ 
 
For SASOL’s ‘founding fathers’, the sudden withdrawal of state support which had hobbled 
SATMAR underlined the importance of oil-from-coal enjoying subsidisation which would be 
                                                
36 Gabrielle Hecht and Paul Edwards ‘History and the Technopolitics of Identity: The Case of Apartheid South 
Africa’. 
37 SASOL Archive, 002, Oil-from-Coal, Report of Interim Committee to establish a South African Synthetic Oil 
Industry, 2 September 1950. 
38 Jean Leger ‘Coal mining: Past Profits, Current Crisis?’, in Stephen Gelb (ed.), South Africa’s Economic 
Crisis, (Cape Town: David Philip, 1991), p 143. 
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protected by law.39 They argued that SASOL was ‘of such national importance’ that the state 
should make big concessions to place the industry on a healthy economic footing. 
Anticipating poor financial results from the outset, Frans du Toit, SASOL’s chairman, had 
argued that ‘the profit motive will have to be subordinated for several years’ but that he 
wouldn’t be ‘the slightest bit panic-stricken if it makes a little more or less profit 
occasionally.’40 Oil-from-coal could not be regarded as a ‘normal undertaking’, Rousseau 
observed, the notion of ‘fair treatment’ – a reference to market competition – need not apply: 
‘It is entitled to and must get preference.’41 In an internal memorandum, Rousseau put this 
more baldly: ‘when we think of oil from coal we must think in terms of artificial economics 
and Government protection.’42  
 
From its start-up SASOL was subsidised by a tax on consumers in the form of a fuel levy, 
and by tariff protection which included an Import Parity Price (IPP) arrangement which 
meant the company sold its petrol at the same price as the petrol of the oil multinationals. 
Because, ceteris paribus, producing a barrel of oil from coal was (and remains) more 
expensive than importing and refining crude oil, at times of low oil prices (i.e. pre-1973) this 
IPP arrangement did what such instruments are designed to do: it subsidised an indigenous 
infant industry. When the oil price spiked the IPP arrangement (which is still operative today) 
generated significant windfalls of which SASOL was obliged to pay over a portion of to the 
state whenever the oil price exceeded $28.50 per barrel. In 1995 this requirement was 
                                                
39 Sasolburg Public Library, Africana Room, Johannes Meintjes Collection, Commentary by E. Rousseau 20 
April, 1974. 
40 SAB, HEN, 7/5/50, P.A. 11/2, Vorm en Finasiering van olie-uit-steenkool Maatskappy, F.du Toit to Min of 
Econ Affairs, 17 November, 1950; SAB, HEN, 3512/539, SASOL (General) F.J. du Toit to Eric Louw, 9 
March, 1950. 
41 SASOL Archive, 303/2/19, Dortmund, E. Rousseau Memorandum, 21 November 1951. 
42 SASOL Archive, 3/4/62, General Principles, Sasol Projects, E. Rousseau Memorandum, 29 March 1962. 
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abolished. The windfall pay-back clause represented the Treasury’s answer to the problem of 
how to manage SASOL’s profit generation at the expense of the fiscus.  
 
‘Artificial economics’ proved essential because SASOL’s factory in Sasolburg suffered 
severe, ongoing technical problems from the moment it came online in 1954 until the end of 
the decade. The government weathered a storm of criticism in parliament and press over the 
amount of money it had committed to the project and SASOL’s failure to deliver on 
production targets. The state gave SASOL’s scientists and engineers the cover they needed to 
make the technology work.43 ‘If we had not had a very patient Government behind us on the 
financial side, we would have by this time been in very, very great trouble’, Rousseau 
admitted.44 A National Party representative’s comments in parliament captured the leeway 
which SASOL enjoyed: ‘the capitalists would not be prepared to bear the losses which the 
state much bear in order to tide this undertaking over its teething troubles.’45  
  
The market geography of oil-from-coal 
 
Once SASOL overcame its teething troubles the parastatal could count on the state having 
intervened to secure oil-from-coal’s market in the interior. The site chosen for SASOL’s 
factory was a vast coalfield close to the Vaal Dam (to meet the water needs of the factory and 
company town) approximately 50 miles from Johannesburg, in the northern Free State. Due 
to the sensitivity of the economics of oil-from-coal to transport costs proximity to coal was 
critical.46 Proximity to the Witwatersrand, ‘the most concentrated marketing area for 
petroleum and allied products’ was essential too because of the necessity of keeping the cost 
                                                
43 Interview by author with Mark Dry, Cape Town, 7 March 2009. 
44 SASOL Archive, 314/2/1, Kellogg Unit, E. Rousseau to W. Smith, 1 September, 1955. 
45 Hansard, South African Parliamentary Debates, 18 March 1959. 
46 SASOL Archive, 19/13/1, SATMAR, J.A. Stegmann, to R.T. Swemmer, 9 April, 1979. 
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of transportation of petrol down. While it would have been more economical to pump product 
to markets in the interior from coastal refineries, government intervention secured the inland 
market for SASOL, ensuring that the oil-from-coal factory was ‘well protected from foreign 
competition because of its distance from the seaboard’ where multinationals landed their 
product.47 This geography underpinned the economics of the project; as far as SASOL’s 
managers were concerned the interior was the company’s ‘natural market’.  
 
Until 1950 South African petrol stations were multi-branded, selling the products of multiple 
companies, including petrol produced by SATMAR. When the ‘solus system’ (single or ‘tied’ 
brands) was introduced in 1951, the government warned the oil multinationals that it was 
‘concerned about the position of the producers of indigenous fuel oil.’48 At this point it 
intervened to secure an outlet for SASOL’s products. SASOL had inherited SATMAR’s 
marketing company and its petrol pumps on the Highveld when Anglovaal sold its Fischer-
Tropsch rights to the state. It took over SATMAR’s pumps and the state obliged the oil 
multinationals to replicate their arrangement with SATMAR so as to ‘uplift’ SASOL’s output 
and accommodate indigenous ‘blue pumps’ on their forecourts. This meant SASOL did not 
need to ‘spend millions, just like the international oil companies, to establish a network of 
filling stations’.49 The SATMAR brand disappeared from the petrol market, remaining 
SATMAR output petrol was mixed with SASOL’s product and sold under the latter’s brand. 
 
As SASOL entered the Highveld market it was wary of the fact that the oil multinationals 
provided station owners with soft loans for forecourt upgrades, provided petrol pump 
attendants with free overalls and training. The multinationals paid station owners one penny 
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for every gallon of petrol sold, an incentivising structure which worked against the sale of 
SASOL petrol so that station petrol tanks were often not filled with the parastatal’s product, 
especially during the early years of the project.50 While the multinationals accepted that ‘they 
must play along with the state and SASOL’ by taking on synthetic fuel output, by the end of 
the 1950s SASOL was still reporting “resistance” from garage owners to the installation of 
‘blue pumps’ on their premises, or their deliberate placement of blue pumps in ‘the most 
inconspicuous places on their premises’ because of the multinationals’ incentive structure.51 
And when SASOL was unable to keep pumps wet on the Highveld, product sharing between 
it and the multinationals was unavoidable, posing certain technical complications.52 Just as 
standardisation allowed the pooling of grain in the Chicago grain market described by 
William Cronon, so standardisation of petrol permitted product sharing on the Highveld.53  
 
By the end of the 1950s SASOL made significant strides in overcoming its technical 
problems, chiefly because of the efforts of its newly established research department. The 
continued low oil price meant the project was being spoken of as ‘uneconomic’ in 
government at the beginning of the 1960s, though for political reasons there could be no talk 
of closure.54 The economic fragility of the project was underlined by SASOL’s response to 
government pressure for it to relocate a proposed expansion to a site other than Sasolburg in 
conformity with Verwoerd’s industrial decentralisation policy. Management warned this 
would do ‘intolerable economic damage’ to the project.55  
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‘The possession of coal is an embarrassment, like having colonies!’ 
 
In 1960 plans for oil-from-coal expansion were shelved because oil remained plentiful and 
cheap. Rousseau was reminded of South Africa’s outlier status on a 1964 visit to Europe 
when an industrialist told him that ‘nobody really bothers about coal, the possession of coal is 
an embarrassment, like having colonies!’56 SASOL instead shifted its efforts in two new 
directions: spearheading South Africa’s strategic stockpiling of imported crude after 
Sharpeville, and the energetic diversification of its activities.  
 
While oil-from-coal production treaded water during the 1960s, SASOL moved aggressively 
into chemical production and the provision of gas. This was not unexpected: because the oil-
from-coal process generated high amounts of methane, managers envisioned ‘a gas grid of 
the type which has been widely developed in the United States, England and Germany’ for 
the distribution of gas from Sasolburg to the Witwatersrand.57 The South African Gas 
Distribution Corporation (GASCOR) was established in 1964 as a subsidiary distributing gas 
via high-pressure pipeline from Sasolburg to dozens of industries in the southern Transvaal. 
Chemical expansion was driven by the realisation that the chemicals derived from the 
Fischer-Tropsch process were economically more valuable than the petrol produced by the 
same process.58  
 
Diversification owed a great deal to the energetic management provided by Etienne 
Rousseau, an acute observer of the move among corporations towards ‘economies of scale’.59 
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The most obvious development in this direction in South Africa’s post-war chemical industry 
would have been a partnership between Anglo Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI) 
and SASOL. AECI was, however, regarded with suspicion in Afrikaner nationalist circles 
because of its association with monopolistic practices.60 Rousseau was impatient with such 
preoccupations. Speaking at the 1964 anniversary of the 1939 Volkskongress he urged 
Afrikaners to put small-minded pettiness behind them and embrace the Managerial 
Revolution.61 Rousseau argued that parastatals stood to benefit from working with 
‘monopolies’, so long as they were ‘careful not to fall into their grasp.’62 A merger with 
AECI was not on the cards but the company (owned by Anglo-American Corporation) set up 
a factory in Sasolburg to produce plastics and cyanide (for the mines) using by-products from 
SASOL’s factory. This did not prevent Rousseau facilitating the development in 1967 of a 
‘loose consortium’ of AECI’s rivals, named Sentrachem.63 SASOL’s leadership of the 
consortium would ensure it the position as key supplier of feedstock to the group. Sentrachem 
and SASOL jointly challenged AECI’s dominance of the chemical industry in the coming 
decades. SASOL entered into nitrogen production for fertiliser - partly at the behest of the 
state - challenging AECI’s dominance which was channelled mainly towards explosives 
production for the mines rather than for agriculture; in doing so, SASOL entered a market  
where fertiliser use was increasing massively.64 Managers described SASOL as a ‘trusted 
instrument of the state in opposing monopolistic conditions’ in the petrochemical industry 
and state intervention as essential to preventing the retarded development of the sector. The 
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protectionist logic underpinning oil-from-coal was therefore extended to SASOL’s chemical 
expansions.65 
 
‘The government’s instrument in the oil domain’ 
 
As anti-apartheid sanctions became a growing threat after Sharpeville, SASOL moved 
increasingly to the centre of the state’s oil strategy, functioning as ‘the government’s 
instrument in the oil domain’.66 The contribution of oil-from-coal to the country’s overall 
petrol supplies remained comparatively small (approximately 30% well into the post-
apartheid era) but SASOL’s managers advised the state on oil strategy, managed the strategic 
oil reserve and facilitated oil procurement as sanctions pressures increased. After Sharpeville 
it was Rousseau who advised the state to buy cheap petroleum on the spot market in bulk for 
stockpiling rather than proceeding with further ‘uneconomic’ oil-from-coal expansion.67 It 
was Rousseau’s recommendation that the government establish the Strategic Fuel Fund in 
1964, the agency tasked with acquiring oil for the strategic reserve which also assumed 
responsibility for oil procurement (via the multinationals but also from dubious oil traders) in 
response to growing anti-apartheid sanction threats. SASOL administered the Fund and oil 
procurement until 1983.68  
 
So inauspicious were conditions for oil-from-coal expansion before 1973 that, in the mid-
1960s, the state began investigating the establishment of a conventional oil refinery in the 
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interior rather than on the coast. The idea was that this refinery would supply a concentrated 
interior market (SASOL’s ‘natural market’) while enjoying protection from competition from 
coastal refineries.69 The multinationals had originally proposed building a pipeline from their 
coastal refineries in Durban to the Witwatersrand for the transportation of refined products. 
SASOL instead pushed the state to establish a pipeline for transporting crude oil to an inland 
refinery.70 SASOL managers convinced government that any inland refinery needed to be 
under state control to defend their market from the possibility of the multinationals increasing 
production in an interior refinery under their control.71 Rousseau invoked SATMAR’s fate 
when he warned government that allowing the multinationals to establish an inland refinery 
would allow them to turn SASOL into the ‘bywoner of the oil business.’72 In 1967 SASOL 
entered a partnership with the local subsidiary of the French company TOTAL – the least 
threatening of the multinationals, possessing no local refining capacity – and the National 
Iranian Oil Company to establish a refinery in Sasolburg to handle Iranian crude. The South 
African Railways and Harbours built the pipeline from Durban which would transport crude 
to Sasolburg free of charge. A tariff structure (‘Natref at the sea’) ensured that the refinery 
was no worse off than it would have been had it been sited on the coast. Disposing of output 
from NATREF, though, still required the co-operation of the multinationals, as with oil-from-
coal output from Sasolburg.73  
 
The massive spike in global oil prices in 1973 created new economic conditions favourable to 
synthetic production. In response, the South African government commissioned SASOL 2, 
the parastatal’s second oil-from-coal plant, to be built in a new town called Secunda, on 
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coalfields in the Eastern Transvaal. The oil crisis proved less disruptive than it might 
otherwise have been because the multinationals helped secure alternative sources of oil to 
keep their refineries in production. While Prime Minister B.J. Vorster supported the idea of 
bringing an increasing percentage of the oil interests under state control, SASOL managers 
and Vorster himself recognised that the multinationals had to be kept happy; they remained 
essential to South Africa’s oil strategy74 and so were compensated for taking on SASOL’s 
output on the Highveld. 
 
Because Iran was the key source of the country’s imported crude oil, the fall of the Shah, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the Iranian Revolution of 1979 represented a major crisis for 
South Africa’s oil strategy. The special relationship with pre-revolutionary Iran had been 
carefully nurtured by SASOL.75 The Revolution ended the National Iranian Oil Company’s 
involvement in NATREF and, almost overnight, the state commissioned SASOL 3, a third 
oil-from-coal plant which was an exact replica of SASOL 2 and built adjacent to the second 
plant. Like the first SASOL plant the new plants would enjoy tariff protection, and were 
funded by fuel levies imposed on motorists. When SASOL 2 and 3 began operating in 1982, 
the multinational oil companies agreed to mothball 30 per cent of their production capacity so 
that they could absorb output from SASOL’s new plants, in exchange for compensation. It 
was the challenge of funding two massive new oil-from-coal plants in the difficult post-Oil 
Shock economic climate that precipitated SASOL’s turn to the private markets for additional 
financing over and above what it received from state coffers - the first step in the parastatal’s 
privatisation.  
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‘The legitimate aspirations of the state corporations’ 
 
SASOL managers were initially unapologetic about their dependence on state support, which 
they worked hard to secure.76 Managers and government officials could cite a general trend 
of ‘state involvement in oil industries’ in newly independent African states as well as 
metropolitan precedent in the British government’s decision to buy into the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company, which later became British Petroleum.77 Certainly, from early on, key figures 
in the project had entertained the possibility that SASOL might one day ‘cease being under 
government control’.78 Evaluating anti-monopoly legislation proposed by the government in 
1952, Rousseau warned that it might foreclose ‘things which SASOL might very easily have 
to do in the course of its natural development’, including investing in or partnering with 
private enterprise.79 Particular emphasis had been placed at key moments on the importance 
of developing and maintaining a measure of independence from the Industrial Development 
Corporation and the state more generally.80 On a number of occasions during the 1960s and 
1970s managers expressed frustration at perceived interference by the state and the 
restrictions being placed on them.81 Many of these tensions centred on SASOL’s desire to 
dispose of profits as it pleased; officials in the Treasury were not always willing to give 
SASOL free reign in this area, prompting Rousseau to complain on one occasion in the early 
1970s of hostility within government towards what he characterised as the ‘legitimate 
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aspirations of the state corporations.’82 Needless to say the legitimacy of these aspirations 
were an ongoing source of contestation in government and wider public debate.  
 
Over time SASOL managers became increasingly defensive about their dependence on state 
support. Some of this first exhibited itself in the context of early public criticism in 
parliament and the press about the fact that SASOL’s petrol was not cheaper than imported 
petrol. Responding to one such bout of criticism Rousseau insisted that ‘SASOL is not a 
Government Department or a monopoly, but is a business which has to compete with some of 
the most astute companies of the world.’83 Rousseau wrote repeatedly to the editors of 
publications complaining about articles which had questioned the economic viability of the 
project under normal circumstances, dismissing one as a ‘write up for African Explosives and 
a scathing attack on the achievements of SASOL.’84 In one instance, an article portraying the 
parastatal as a beneficiary of ‘socialist economics’ – a common term of opprobrium –
prompted an instruction to SASOL’s Public Relations department to ‘see that this does not 
gain ground.’85  
 
While Rousseau described himself as a rare breed of Afrikaner willing to forego more 
lucrative opportunities in the private sector for service in the public sector, he undoubtedly 
saw himself as essentially a businessman. In 1958 he rejected proposals for increased 
parliamentary oversight of parastatals on the grounds that centuries of experience had taught 
that ‘shareholders money is most effectively protected by a Board consisting of capable 
directors’, insisting that the country’s parastatals had ‘been a success because from a 
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managerial side of things, they have been allowed to function like private undertakings.’86 
When SASOL was awarded the the Rand Daily Mail Business Achievement prize in 1975 – a 
symbolically important moment – the comments by Rousseau’s successor, David de Villiers, 
reflected the desire of SASOL managers to underplay the effect of dependence and protection 
by the state: 
 
There is so much talk in South Africa about the dangers of creeping socialism. It is 
usually said if an organisation is state financed the discipline of competition is lacking 
and that leads to technological stagnation and general incompetence... this very business 
we are in has through the years subjected us to the discipline of market forces. In the 
same manner as any other company we had to develop a commercial approach of cost-
consciousness, market competitiveness and a continuous striving for productivity.87 
 
 
Conclusion 
In 1979, in an important symbolic move, SASOL relocated its headquarters from Sasolburg 
to Rosebank in Johannesburg. This coincided with the decision to proceed with a public share 
offering on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. While the involvement of private shareholders 
had been explicitly rejected as strategically unwise at the project’s outset, in the closing years 
of the 1970s senior figures in government - such as economic advisor P.J. Riekert - actively 
advocated share offering and both government ministers and SASOL managers were 
evidently assuming the desirability of such a step.88 The putative discipline of the market was 
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both a sore point for SASOL managers and possessed a certain lustre. It was the Iranian 
Revolution and resultant panic leading to the decision to proceed with the SASOL 3 plant in 
addition to the already approved SASOL 2, which precipitated the share offering.89 SASOL 
embarked on a two-fold massive oil-from-coal expansion in the name of securing the 
apartheid state’s strategic interests, which aimed to exploit the fact that the oil price had 
skyrocketed after both the 1973 Oil Shock and the Iranian Revolution. The cutting off of 
Iranian sources of imported crude oil because of the Revolution was the straw that broke the 
camel’s back, so to speak: massive oil-from-coal expansion was not only now economically 
viable because of the oil price but was strategically essential. A share offering was financially 
necessary; it would not have been possible for the public purse to carry the full cost of the 
two new plants in Secunda. Crucial private investment would supplement the new fuel levy 
and loans from the Industrial Development Corporation which the state would use to help 
fund the expansion. This made SASOL the first South African parastatal to be listed on the 
stock exchange.  
 
The heavily oversubscribed listing on the JSE occurred ‘on terms very favourable to 
investors’ because the state remained committed to ongoing subsidisation via fuel levies, the 
IPP and the provision of continued ‘soft loans’ through the IDC.90 SASOL’s special strategic 
status meant minimal risk and guaranteed profitability for private investors. Despite public 
proclamations about SASOL shares being readily available to the ‘man on the street’ –a 
South African version of Margaret Thatcher’s fantasy of ‘people’s capitalism’ – the share 
allocation heavily favoured a ‘narrow base of shareholders/stakeholders’, primarily major 
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South African conglomerates.91 This initial privatisation and its subsequent phases were 
featherbedded by continued state support, the majority of which was only belatedly removed 
in the post-apartheid era.92  
 
SASOL’s hybrid identity as a company with private shareholders enjoying public subsidies 
proved immediately controversial. In January of 1981 a member of a parliamentary 
committee asked:  
 
It is not clear in my mind what the method is that is adopted to ensure that the money which 
comes from the taxpayer toward the SASOL II project does not indirectly result in additional 
profits for the investor. SASOL now has private shareholders who benefit from the success of 
SASOL, but to some extent SASOL has been directly and indirectly financed by taxpayers 
money... I want to be quite sure that there is a distinction made between the two sets of funds and 
that the taxpayer gets his due in the same way that the shareholder will get his.93  
  
SASOL’s history, as a parastatal funded by taxpayers’ money and an official regulatory 
regime heavily skewed to its advantage, has proven hard for the company to shake off. As it 
has increasingly turned its attention to global expansion and the New York Stock Exchange, 
it has been repeatedly reprimanded for engaging in anti-competitive practices which unfairly 
leveraged advantages derived from apartheid-era state support.94 More than moral complicity 
with apartheid, it is SASOL’s historic dependence on significant financial support from the 
state which most often has the company on the back foot today.  
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In 2007 a task team appointed by Trevor Manuel, then Minister of Finance, recommended 
that the government institute a windfall tax on SASOL because of ‘excessive profits’ which 
SASOL had accumulated by leveraging the historic regulatory advantages it enjoyed under 
apartheid.95 It received a last minute reprieve, with the Ministry deciding against 
implementing the task team’s recommendations. The Import Parity Pricing mechanism which 
ensures SASOL’s petrol retails at the same price as the imported refined product of oil 
multinationals still functions today, and it remains an ongoing source of contention. In 
August 2013, Jeremy Cronin, Deputy General Secretary of the South African Communist 
Party addressed the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) 
congress. After providing a thumbnail sketch of SASOL’s history of state support, Cronin 
directly invoked the fact that SASOL ‘sells at the pump at the import parity price’ despite the 
fact that the global price of oil was, at the time of his speech, above $100 per barrel. ‘This 
means we are all subsidising super profits for what is now a privatised SASOL’.96 The 
alleged disciplining effects of the market remain elusive. 
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